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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the results of an investigation into ways in which the safety risks of travel on road 
and rail interact with each other in Great Britain, other than through physical contact such as at level 
crossings. The two main foci of the paper are: (1) an analysis of the ‘whole journey’ risks of journeys 
for which the national rail system is the main mode, but which also include stages by other transport 
modes to provide access to the railway system; and (2) an analysis of the effect on safety risk of inter-
modal transfers between rail and road. On (1), walking to and from stations was estimated to account 
on average for 65% of the overall door-to-door risk of being killed on rail journeys; the rail system 
itself accounts for 21% of the risk, and other access modes account for the remaining 14%. The 
average distance walked to and from stations is 0.9 km per rail journey, and this walking accounts for 
5% of all walking nationally. On (2), it was found that increasing rail fares to fund railway safety 
measures may lead passengers to switch from rail to car, but for most sensible rail safety measures, the 
additional risks from such diversions are small compared with the intended rail safety benefits. 
However, for high-cost rail safety measures funded by passengers, the additional risks from diversions 
may be of the same order as the intended safety benefits. The last section of the paper explores the 
effects of variations in the casualty rates of rail users as pedestrians and car users, because their road 
risks may be different from those of all road users. Such variations could alter the detailed conclusions 
of the paper, but the scale of such effects appears to be modest. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Safety is one of the five primary objectives of integrated transport policy in Britain1, but safety 
policies themselves are generally developed separately for each mode. In practice both achieved levels 
of safety and safety expenditure relative to risks are higher for the public transport modes than they are 
for the roads. This leads to questions about whether safety resources are used to best effect. 
 
Although they are separately managed, there are some strong interactions between rail and road safety. 
The most obvious of these interactions are at the physical interfaces between the rail and road systems: 
these include collisions at level crossings and bridges. Level crossings now contribute the greatest 
potential for catastrophic risk on the railway and they accounted for 36% of all railway fatalities in the 
four years to 2003/04. However, this paper focuses on interactions other than the physical interfaces, 
though the physical interfaces are implicitly included in the risk estimates presented. The two foci of 
the present paper are  
(1) an analysis of the ‘whole journey’ risks of journeys for which the national rail system is the 
main mode, but which also include stages by other transport modes to provide access to the 
railway system; and  
(2) an analysis of the effect on safety risk of inter-modal transfers between rail and road. 
 
The reason for concentrating on these is that they are important but less investigated than the physical 
interfaces, which are the subject of other research projects. The previous literature on the interaction 
between road and rail risks as discussed in this paper is limited. Jorgensen (1993) is an interesting 
paper with similarities to the present one that considers risks on commuting journeys in Copenhagen 
when undertaken by different modes. L Evans et al (1990) compared the safety of driving and flying in 
the Unites States: we refer to their paper below. 
 
The principal results presented here are for Great Britain as a whole, though some results on rail travel 
patterns are separately presented for journeys wholly in London, journeys with one end in London, and 
journeys with neither end in London. The primary data sources are: 
(1) the British National Travel Survey (NTS) for 1999-2001 for data on the patterns of national 
rail use, on modes by which national rail travellers reach railway stations, and for the 
development of a rail/car modal shift model; and 
(2) data on the risks of death and injury per passenger-km for national rail travel, for car travel, 
and for all access modes. These data cover casualties both to the travellers themselves and to 
others affected, such as pedestrians in the case of motorised road travel, and level crossing 
users in the case of rail travel. These data are based on various periods of up to five years 
ending in 2003. 
 
Figure 1 shows the structure of the paper following this introduction. Section 2 presents data analysed 
from the NTS on the access stages of journeys for which main-line rail (labelled ‘surface rail’ in the 
NTS) is the main mode. Section 3 presents estimates of casualty risks by mode, both for travellers 
themselves and for other people affected. Section 4 combines the results of sections 2 and 3 to give 
‘whole journey’ risks for journeys with rail as main mode. Section 5 estimates the effects on casualties 
of the switching of journeys between rail and car, using the modal risks from section 3 and the ‘whole 
journey’ risks of rail journeys from section 4. Section 6 presents a modal split model estimating in 
particular the response of travellers to increases in rail fares. Section 7 combines this model with the 
results of section 5 to estimate the net effects on safety of two representative rail safety measures 
funded by passenger fare increases, taking account of the effect of such increases in inducing 
diversions from rail to car. Finally, it is possible that the risks for the rail using population when 
                                                 
1 The other four primary objectives are environment, economy, accessibility and integration. 
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walking or driving differ from those of the population as a whole. Section 8 considers reasons for this, 
and explores the effect of different risks on the results. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of paper 
 
 
 
 
2. JOURNEYS FOR WHICH SURFACE RAIL IS THE MAIN MODE 
 
The National Travel Survey (NTS) collects information about all journeys made by respondents in a 
period of seven consecutive days beginning on a random day of the week. The NTS defines a (one-
way) journey as set of 1 or more stages by different modes, illustrated by the 4-stage journey to work 
in Figure 2 that includes one stage each by car, rail, bus and walking. The NTS defines the ‘main 
mode’ of a journey as the mode with the longest stage. The NTS defines ‘surface rail’ as the main line 
or ‘national’ or ex-British Rail network, and these terms are used interchangeably. Surface rail does 
not include the London Underground or other metros, which are treated as different modes.  
 
Walk stages of more than 50 yards are included in the NTS, but, in order to reduce the burden on 
respondents, walk stages of less than 1 mile are recorded only on the seventh day. Therefore walk 
stages of less than 1 mile need separate analysis and multiplication by 7 before being recombined with 
the other data. There is some evidence that walk stages of 1 mile or more, which should be recorded in 
full on the first six days, are somewhat under-recorded, but in the present work no adjustments are 
made for that.  
 
Figure 2: Illustration of stages in a journey 
 
 
Stage 1 
Drive car 
from home 
to local 
station 
Stage 2  
Take train to 
destination 
station 
Stage 3: 
Take bus 
from 
destination 
station 
Stage 4: 
Walk from 
bus stop to 
work place 
Section 2: 
Access stages of rail 
journeys from NTS 
Section 3:  
Risk per passenger-
km by mode
Section 4: 
‘Whole journey’ risk 
of rail journeys
Section 5: 
Effect on casualties 
of rail/car switching
Section 6: 
Rail/car modal 
split model 
Section 7: 
Net effect of representative 
rail safety measures 
Section 8: 
Variations in 
casualty rates 
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Table 1: Average number of stages per journey 
for journeys with different main modes 
Main mode Average number of 
stages per journey
Walk 1.0
Car 1.0
Taxi 1.0
Other private 1.1
Local bus 1.7
London Underground 2.6
Surface rail 2.9
Source: Department for Transport (2002), 
Table 3.9 
 
 
Table 2: Average number of stages per journey on journeys with surface rail as main mode 
Mode Within 
London
One end 
London
Not 
London 
Great Britain
Main surface rail 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Secondary surface rail 0.002 0.017 0.018 0.013
Air 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
London Underground, light rail 0.279 0.424 0.021 0.218
Car, taxi, other private 0.130 0.495 0.319 0.311
Bus or coach 0.205 0.137 0.131 0.156
Bicycle 0.007 0.016 0.022 0.016
Walk 1.242 1.046 0.917 1.056
Total 2.865 3.137 2.429 2.770
 
 
Table 3: Average distance travelled per journey on journeys with surface rail as main mode  
 including access (kilometres) 
Mode Within 
London
One end 
London
Not 
London 
Great Britain
Main surface rail 16.573 77.575 42.924 44.738
Secondary surface rail 0.009 0.240 0.715 0.358
Air 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.031
London Underground, light rail 1.273 3.038 0.160 1.339
Car, taxi, other private 0.432 3.690 2.561 2.225
Bus or coach 0.587 0.645 0.896 0.727
Bicycle 0.028 0.054 0.078 0.056
Walk 1.077 0.872 0.795 0.905
Total 19.979 86.115 48.206 50.379
 
 
There were 5,749 journeys in the NTS for 1999-2001 for which surface rail was the main mode. Most 
of these involved a single surface rail stage, but the journeys also included 74 second or third surface 
rail stages, which are described in the tables below as ‘secondary rail’. In addition, there were 202 
surface rail stages on journeys for which another mode was the main mode (such as rail stages to 
airports for domestic air journeys); these other journeys are disregarded in the analysis. Of the 5,749 
journeys, 1,791 (31%) were wholly within London, 1,663 (29%) had one end in London, and 2,295 
(40%) had both ends outside London. Table 1 gives the average number of stages by each mode per 
journey for which surface rail was the main mode, and Table 2 gives the average distance travelled on 
these journeys by each mode, including the access modes. It will be seen from Table 2 that the average 
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access distance travelled per rail journey for some modes – such as bicycle – is low. This is not 
because access journeys by bicycle are necessarily short, but because bicycles are used relatively 
infrequently in Britain to access railway stations. 
 
The most notable feature of the results in Tables 1 and 2 is the importance of walking as an access 
mode on surface rail journeys. Table 1 shows that on average surface rail journeys included 1.77 
stages in addition to the main rail stage itself. Of these access stages, 1.06 were walks, and 0.71 were 
by all other modes combined.  
 
Table 2 shows that the average distance walked was 0.905 km per rail journey. Given that there were 
about 950 million surface rail journeys per year in 1999-2001 (Strategic Rail Authority 2005, Table 
1.2a) this implies that about 860 million person-kilometres per year would have been walked in 
connection with surface rail journeys, or an average of 14.8 km per person in Great Britain. The 
average total distance walked for all purposes was 304 kilometres per person (Department for 
Transport (DfT) 2002, Table 3.1), so the proportion of all walking made in connection with surface 
rail journeys was just under 5%. In passing, it may be noted that there is likely to be a similar amount 
of walking per journey on journeys made with the London Underground as main mode, of which there 
were also about 950 million per year in 1999-2001. If so, it would follow that about 10% of all 
walking nationally is in connection with rail journeys. 
 
 
3. RISK OF CASUALTIES PER PASSENGER-KILOMETRE 
 
Table 3 gives the adopted risks per passenger-kilometre travelled on the relevant modes, measured in 
various ways. The first column of data gives fatalities to travellers or passengers per billion travelled-
km. The second column gives fatalities to other people per billion travelled-km; ‘other people’ consist 
of staff and members of the public including those at level crossings (but excluding trespassers) for the 
rail modes; pedestrians and drivers for buses; and pedestrians for the private road modes. The third 
column is the sum of the first two. The fourth to sixth columns give corresponding rates for the sum of 
fatalities and weighted serious injuries. The weight adopted for serious injuries relative to fatalities is 
11.24%. This is the DfT’s valuation of a serious injury relative to a fatality in 2003, which was 
£147,460/£1,312,260 (Department for Transport 2004a). The discussion in this paper focuses on the 
results for fatalities, but the results for the sum of fatalities and weighted injuries are presented in the 
tables alongside those for fatalities. The qualitative results for the two risk measures are similar, but 
there are quantitative differences. The rates in Table 3 are for accidents involving vehicles. The 
authors have also briefly considered accidental fatalities to people on the highway or at railway 
stations not involving road or rail vehicles, such as from falls on the pavement or down stairs, but 
these are not reported here. 
 
 
Table 4: Casualties involving vehicles per billion passenger-kilometres: Great Britain 2003 
 Fatalities only 
Fatalities and weighted 
serious injuries 
Transport 
mode 
Trav-
ellers
Others All Trav-
ellers
Others All
Surface rail 0.279 0.456 0.735 0.478 0.547 1.025
Air 0.00 0 0 0.0001 0 0.0001
LUL, light rail 0.379 0 0.379 0.651 0 0.651
Car or taxi 2.696 0.875 3.571 5.354 1.921 7.275
Bus or coach 0.272 1.437 1.709 1.497 2.476 3.973
Bicycle 25.3 0.594 25.894 82.497 1.882 84.379
Walk 41.7 0 41.7 89.233 0 89.233
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The sources of the accident rates in Table 3 are various: they include the Department of Transport’s 
estimated modal fatality rates for travellers (DfT 2005), the Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) 
annual railway safety reports (HSE 2004 and predecessors), the Railway Group Annual Safety 
Performance Report (Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) 2005a), and Road Casualties Great 
Britain (DfT 2004b and predecessors). The rates are generally based on observed fatalities and 
injuries, but the railway data were also checked for consistency with the RSSB’s Safety Risk Model 
(RSSB 2005b). 
 
The most important features of Table 3 are the relative fatality rates per traveller-kilometre for surface 
rail, car travel and walking. The traveller fatality rate for car travel is about 10 times greater than for 
rail travel, and that for walking is about 150 times greater than for rail travel. The corresponding ratios 
including fatalities to non-travellers are about 5 for car relative to surface rail and 60 for walking 
relative to surface rail. 
 
4. ‘WHOLE JOURNEY’ RISKS FOR JOURNEYS WITH RAIL AS MAIN MODE 
 
Table 4 combines the average distances travelled on the different stages of journeys with surface rail 
as main mode in Great Britain in Table 2 with the casualty rates in Table 3 to give casualties per 
billion surface rail journeys, including access. The remarkable feature is the contribution walking 
makes to overall risks. This is because walking is an important mode of access and because it has 
relatively high casualty rates. Table 4 shows that, for travellers only, 21% of the ‘whole journey’ risk 
is on the railway system, 65% is in walking to and from stations, and the remaining 14% is on other 
access modes. When fatalities to non-travellers are added, the proportion attributed to walking declines 
because walking imposes no transport risk on others. In that case, the proportions are 40% on the rail 
system, 46% in walking and 14% on other modes. It may be noted that the 40% on the rail system 
includes the relatively large number of casualties to level crossing users, which are often related to 
misuse of the level crossing. 
 
 
Table 5: Casualties per billion passenger-journeys with surface rail as main mode including 
access: Great Britain: 2003 
 Fatalities only 
Fatalities and weighted 
serious injuries 
Transport mode 
Traveller Other All Traveller Other All
Main surface rail 12.47 20.40 32.87 21.38 24.49 45.87
Secondary surface rail 0.10 0.16 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.37
Air 0.00 0 0 0.00 0 0
LUL, light rail 0.51 0 0.51 0.87 0 0.87
Car or taxi 6.00 1.95 7.94 11.91 4.27 16.18
Bus or coach 0.20 1.05 1.24 1.09 1.80 2.89
Bicycle 1.41 0.03 1.44 4.60 0.10 4.71
Walk 37.74 0 37.74 80.76 0 80.76
All surface rail stages 12.57 20.56 33.13 21.56 24.68 46.24
Non-surface rail stages 45.85 3.02 48.87 99.23 6.18 105.41
All journey stages 58.42 23.59 82.01 120.79 30.86 151.61
 
 
5. EFFECT ON RISK OF DIVERTING JOURNEYS FROM RAIL TO CAR 
 
Table 5 uses the average distances in Table 2 and the casualty rates in Table 3 to estimate the effects 
on casualties of diverting journeys from rail to car. The table assumes that the average rail journey and 
its access stages are replaced by a single-stage journey made by car, with no access stages. The car 
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distance is assumed to be equal to the total distance of the original journey, including the access 
stages. 
 
 
Table 6: Effect on casualties per journey of switching journeys between surface rail and car as 
main mode: Great Britain: 2003 
 Fatalities per billion traveller-journeys 
Fatalities and weighted 
serious injuries per billion 
traveller-journeys 
 
Trav-
ellers
Others All Trav-
ellers 
Others All
Rail    
  Main rail stage 
  Access stages 
All journey stages 
12.47 
45.95 
58.42
20.40 
3.19 
23.59
32.87 
49.14 
82.01
21.38 
99.40 
120.79 
24.48 
6.38 
30.86 
45.87 
105.78 
151.65
Car    
Single stage 135.82 44.07 179.89 269.73 96.79 366.52
Change in casualties +77.40 +20.48 +97.88 +148.94 +67.70 +216.64
Ratio: Car/rail 2.32 1.87 2.19 2.23 3.14 2.42
 
 
The justification for disregarding any access stages for car journeys is the finding from NTS data that 
journeys by car as main mode have generally very few access stages: the average number of additional 
stages for car drivers and passengers per main-mode car journey was only 0.03 in 1999-2001 (DfT 
2002, Table 3.9), compared with 1.77 additional stages for surface rail travellers in Table 1 above. The 
figure of 0.03 is even lower at 0.02 in the more recent report on the 2002-2003 NTS (DfT, 2005b, 
Table 2.3).  
 
It is possible that rail-replacement car journeys would travel a greater proportion of their distance on 
motorways than the overall national proportion of 18% (DfT 2004c, Table 7.4), and therefore be rather 
safer. On the other hand, the average distance of rail journeys in Table 2 is only about 50 km, 
including access, so any such effect is likely to be small. 
 
The main conclusion from Table 5 is that the diversion of journeys from rail to car increases fatalities 
both to travellers and to others as would be expected, but only by factors of just over 2 rather than by 
higher factors that would be expected from a simple comparison of the main-mode casualty rates in 
Table 3. This is mainly because travel by car avoids the relatively high-risk walk stages of rail 
journeys. 
 
6. RAIL/CAR MODAL SPLIT MODEL 
 
Rail safety measures, such as advanced train control systems, can sometimes be expensive but they 
may save few casualties, because rail systems are already relatively safe. Furthermore, the majority of 
rail passenger fatalities do not occur in the high-profile train collisions and derailments, but in personal 
accidents such as passengers falling in front of trains, and these are not reduced by measures such as 
advanced train control systems. If high-cost rail safety measures are funded by passengers through 
higher fares, it is possible in principle for some passengers to be diverted from rail to car, and for the 
additional casualties caused by the car travel to outweigh the casualty savings on the rail system itself. 
In that case, the net effect of the safety measure would be to increase casualties, not reduce them. This 
possibility is investigated in this and the following section. 
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The first step in the investigation is the development of a modal split model for the choice between rail 
and car. Binomial Logit models were used, in which the probability of choosing rail was the dependent 
variable, and rail fare was one of the independent variables. This model was based on the NTS data. 
Separate models were developed for the three regional groupings of journeys within London, journeys 
with one end in London, and journeys with neither end in London, and for Great Britain as a whole. 
The sum of the three regions gives results similar to those for Great Britain as a whole, so to estimate 
the national effects of safety measures the model for Great Britain is used. Table 6 shows the 
explanatory variables in the final models with their standard errors. All the coefficients in the final 
models are statistically significantly different from zero, and all have the expected signs. In particular, 
increasing the rail fare reduces the probability of choosing rail.  
 
The modal split model was estimated for and applied to only travellers who are presumed to have a 
choice between rail and car. Rail users who do not hold a driving licence and/or who are from non-car 
owning households are presumed to be ‘captive’ to rail, and not have a choice. Car users from NTS 
‘Primary Sampling Units’ (i.e. local areas) from which no rail journey was made by anyone to any 
destination are presumed to have no viable rail service, and thus be captive to car. Table 7 shows the 
proportions of captive and non-captive rail users on this definition. The fitting of the model was based 
on eligible journeys for which a cost or fare for the not-used mode (car for rail journeys and rail for car 
journeys) could be imputed from similar journeys in the NTS dataset.  
 
Table 7 shows the estimated elasticity of the non-captive rail journeys with respect to fares from the 
modal split models, and thence the rate at which rail users would transfer to car as a result of fare rises. 
The national number of rail journeys is currently about 1 billion per year. (According to the SRA 
2005, there were 976 million passenger-journeys in 2002-03 and 1,014 in 2003-04.) The illustrative 
results in the bottom right of Table 7 therefore indicate that about 1.5 million would transfer to car 
given a 0.5% rise in fares, and 15 million given a 5% rise in fares. 
 
 
Table 7: Coefficients (with standard errors in brackets) in logit models for 
probability of non-captive users choosing rail 
Mode Within 
London
One end 
London
Not London Great Britain
Intercept -2.262 
(0.3672)
-1.716 
(0.2323)
-5.207 
(0.5582) 
-4.506 
(0.3182)
Journey length (km) 8.987*10-2 
(0.9507*10-2)
1.358*10-2 
(0.1845*10-2)
1.656*10-2 
(0.2410*10-2) 
1.739*10-2 
(0.1444*10-2)
Car cost (pence/km) 2.447*10-1 
(0.6668*10-1) 
1.748*10-1 
(0.3381*10-1)
Rail fare (pence/km) -1.068*10-1 
(0.1762*10-1)
-4.078*10-2 
(1.075*10-2)
-6.166*10-2 
(1.995*10-2) 
-5.204*10-2 
(0.9157*10-2)
Walk time to station 
(minutes) 
-6.274*10-2 
(1.162*10-2)
-2.622*10-2 
(0.6909*10-2) 
-3.334*10-2 
(0.4126*10-2)
Household income 
(£/year) 
1.673*10-5 
(0.3363*10-5)
0.7873*10-5 
(0.2728*10-5)
 1.565*10-5 
(0.1910*10-5)
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Table 8: Journeys with surface rail as main mode 
Mode Within 
London
One end 
London
Not 
London 
Sum of 3 
regions 
Great 
Britain
Distribution of rail journeys in 1999-
2001 NTS (100% = 5,749) 
  
‘Captive’ to rail 12.30% 6.47% 20.42%  39.19%
Not ‘captive’ to rail 18.86% 22.46% 19.50%  60.81%
All 31.15% 28.93% 39.92%  100.00%
Modelled elasticity of ‘non-captive’ 
rail journeys with respect to fare -0.860 -0.279 -0.543  -0.489
Rail journeys transferring to car per 
unit of national total for 
  
  0.5% rise in rail fares 0.000809 0.000313 0.000528 0.001649 0.001484
  5% rise in rail fares 0.007893 0.003104 0.005193 0.016190 0.014623
 
 
7. IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFETY MEASURES 
 
The next step in investigating the effect of rail safety measures funded by fares is to combine the 
results of modal split model in section 6 with the casualty rates in section 5. It is possible to use these 
results to consider any combination of safety reductions and fare rises. For the purposes of illustration, 
Table 8 presents results for two representative combinations: 
 
(1) a safety measure, or set of safety measures, reducing all surface railway risk, including risk 
to non-passengers, by 10%, funded by a 0.5% rise in fares; and  
 
(2) a safety measure reducing risk only to rail passengers by 10%, funded by a 5% increase in 
fares. 
 
The results in Table 8 are expressed in changes in casualties per billion (initial) passenger journeys. As 
noted above, it happens that there are currently about one billion surface rail passenger-journeys per 
year in Great Britain, so that the changes in casualties in Table 8 may also be interpreted 
approximately as changes in casualties per year. Figures 3 and 4 show the changes in fatalities 
graphically for safety measures (1) and (2) respectively. 
 
Safety measure (1) may be regarded as representative of many general safety measures or collections 
of safety measures on the railways. It should be noted that any set of safety measures capable of saving 
10% of all casualties would be relatively large and pervasive, but smaller sets of safety measures with 
the same benefit/cost ratio would give similar conclusions to those below. For example, a safety 
measure saving 1% of casualties for a 0.05% fare rise lead to similar conclusions. The first row of 
figures in Table 8 and the left-hand block of Figure 3 show that the intended direct effect of measures 
(1) would be to save 3.3 fatalities or 4.4 fatalities plus weighted injuries per billion passenger-
journeys, which are about 10% of the current numbers per year. These savings are partly to passengers 
and partly to non-passengers including rail staff and third parties such as users of level crossings. The 
next three rows in Table 8 and blocks in Figure 3 show the safety effects of the modal shift of journeys 
from rail to car as a consequence of the rail fare increase. The modal shift leads to fewer rail journeys, 
fewer access-to-rail journeys, and more car journeys. Table 8 and Figure 3 show that for these kinds of 
safety measures the secondary effects are small relative to the intended direct rail safety improvement. 
This is because the assumed fare rise of 0.5% is small, and therefore the modal shift is small. The 
intended effects therefore dominate, and the overall savings in casualties are only slightly less than the 
intended savings. 
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Table 9: Changes in casualties per billion rail journeys due to rail safety measures financed by 
passengers: Great Britain: 2003 
 Changes in fatalities only 
Changes in fatalities and 
weighted serious injuries 
 
Pass Others All Pass Others All
(1) 10% fall in overall rail casualty 
rates; 0.5% rise in fares 
 
Intended reduction on national rail -1.26 -2.06 -3.32 -2.16 -2.47 -4.62
Effect of fewer rail passengers -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06
Effect of fewer rail access stages -0.07 -0.00 -0.07 -0.15 -0.01 -0.16
Effect of replacement car journeys +0.20 +0.07 +0.27 +0.40 +0.14 +0.54
Total -1.14 -2.02 -3.16 -1.93 -2.37 -4.30
(2) 10% fall in passenger rail 
casualty rates; 5% rise in fares 
 
Intended reduction on national rail -1.26 -0.00 -1.26 -2.16 -0.00 -2.16
Effect of fewer rail passengers -0.17 -0.30 -0.47 -0.29 -0.37 -0.65
Effect of fewer rail access stages -0.67 -0.04 -0.71 -1.47 -0.09 -1.56
Effect of replacement car journeys +1.99 +0.64 +2.63 +4.00 +1.44 +5.44
Total -0.11 +0.30 +0.19 +0.09 +0.98 +1.07
 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
The assumed increase in rail fares for safety measures (1) raises about £13 million per year at 2003/04 
prices after allowing for the losses in passengers due to modal transfer. If the £13 million is divided by 
the 4.4 rail fatalities and equivalent serious injuries saved per year, the resulting cost per equivalent 
fatality prevented is £2.9 million. In reality the cost per equivalent fatality prevented would be less 
than this, because the safety measures would provide additional benefits besides the prevention of 
fatalities and serious injuries. These additional benefits would include the prevention of slight 
casualties, and the avoidance of damage, disruption, and accident investigation costs. After taking 
these into account, the cost per equivalent fatality prevented might perhaps be of the same order as the 
2003 official valuation of preventing fatalities of £1.3 million (DfT, 2004, Table 1). On most 
interpretations of the law, such safety measures are required to be implemented on the railways. This 
contrast with roads, where there is no corresponding requirement. Similar conclusions would apply to 
smaller or less pervasive safety measures with similar benefit/cost ratios. 
 
Safety measure (2) is representative of a high-cost system safety measure saving casualties to train 
occupants, such as additional train protection. The 5% increase in fares would raise £130 million per 
year after allowing for the losses in passengers due to modal transfer. This would support a capital 
sum of about £2 billion, which is of the order of magnitude of the cost of new train protection systems 
that have been considered. The reason for supposing that this kind of safety measure would reduce 
passenger casualties by not more than 10% is that although the safety measure might be very effective 
at reducing the type of train accident for which it was designed, it would not reduce personal 
passenger accidents, such as falls, nor would it reduce other kinds of train accidents, such as those due 
to rolling stock or infrastructure faults. As noted in section 6, train accidents account for only a 
minority of passenger casualties. On the other hand, improved train protection would reduce the risk of 
casualties to on-board train staff as well as to passengers, but their numbers are small relative to 
passengers, so it is reasonable to disregard them in this representative calculation. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
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Figure 3: Effect of illustrative rail safety measure saving 10% of fatalities for 0.5% increase in 
fares 
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Figure 4: Effect of rail safety measure saving 10% of only passenger fatalities for 5% increase in 
fares 
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The top row in the bottom half of Table 8 and the first block in Figure 4 show that the intended direct 
effect safety measure (2) is estimated to reduce rail passenger fatalities by about 1.3 fatalities or 2.2 
fatalities and weighted injuries per billion passenger-journeys. However, the secondary safety effects 
due to modal shift from rail to car are much larger than with safety measures (1) because the assumed 
fare increase is ten times greater. Two of the secondary effects – fewer rail journeys and fewer access-
to-rail journeys – reduce casualties, but these are more than counterbalanced by the additional 
casualties in the replacement car journeys. The net balance is almost no change in fatalities. The 
corresponding calculation for the weighted combination of fatalities and serious injuries shows a net 
increase of about 1 equivalent fatality per billion passenger-journeys.  
 
These results therefore confirm the intuitive expectation that a high-cost railway safety measure that is 
funded by passengers and has relatively small rail safety benefits could induce a modal shift from rail 
to car that would negate the intended safety benefit. However, it is perhaps surprising that the effect of 
modal shift is not larger. One of the explanations is the argument developed in section 4: reducing rail 
travel reduces access risk as well as on-rail risk, so that the effect of switching from rail to car 
increases the ‘whole journey’ risk not by a factor of about 10, but only by a factor of 2+. Secondly, 
Table 7 shows that about 39% of rail passengers are ‘captive’ to rail, in the sense that they either come 
from households without cars or do not hold a driving licence. Such people are assumed not to be able 
to respond to rail fare increases by switching to the car, and therefore do not contribute to increasing 
risk by modal shift. 
 
This does not imply that high-cost rail safety measures such as (2) are worthwhile. Even if all the 
modal shift arguments are disregarded, one is still left with a safety measure costing about £130 
million per year, and saving perhaps 2 on-rail equivalent fatalities per year in fatalities and serious 
injuries. There would also be other safety benefits besides the prevention of fatalities and serious 
injuries, as for any safety measure. Even when these are taken into account, the cost per fatality 
prevented by safety measure (2) would be some tens of millions of £s, compared with the official 
valuation of preventing a fatality in 2003 of £1.3 million. That is the primary argument against such 
safety measures. The argument is reinforced by the arguments about modal shift, but only modestly.  
 
 
Table 10: Relative fatality risks for pedestrians and car users by age: Great Britain 1998-2000 
Age of 
traveller 
(years) 
Proportion of 
rail-km in 
given age 
group 
Proportion of 
pedestrian-
km in given 
age group
Proportion of 
car user-km 
in given age 
group
Fatality risk per 
km as pedestrian 
of given age 
relative to all ages 
Fatality risk per 
km as car user of 
given age relative 
to all ages
   
<17 6.1% 24.9% 11.5% 0.53 0.48
17-20 6.1% 6.4% 4.7% 0.86 3.55
21-29 24.2% 12.4% 14.3% 0.81 1.51
30-39 24.7% 15.0% 21.5% 0.67 0.69
40-49 17.5% 11.7% 19.3% 0.74 0.51
50-59 12.7% 11.2% 15.8% 0.75 0.58
60-69 5.5% 9.5% 8.1% 1.03 0.93
≥70 3.3% 8.9% 4.9% 3.89 3.05
All ages 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1.00 1.00
   
Relative risk for pedestrians or car users with same age 
distribution as rail users: 0.85 1.10
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Table 11: Relative fatality risks for pedestrians and car users by time of day: Great Britain 
1998-2000 
Time of day of 
travel 
Assumed 
proportion of 
rail travel in 
given time 
period
Proportion 
of pedestrian 
travel in 
given time 
period 
Proportion 
of car travel 
in given 
time period
Risk of fatality 
as pedestrian 
in given time 
relative to all 
times 
Risk of 
fatality as car 
user in given 
time relative 
to all times
  
06.00 to midnight 100.00% 99.42% 98.52% 0.88 0.85
Midnight to 06.00 0.00% 0.58% 1.48% 21.25 10.70
All times 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 1.00 1.00
  
Relative risk for pedestrians or car users with same travel time 
distribution as rail users: 0.88 0.85
 
 
 
Table 12: Fatalities per billion traveller-journeys and effect of switching between surface rail 
and car as main mode for different pedestrian and car user risks 
 Traveller fatalities per billion journeys 
Pedestrian risk Base risk 
(As Table 4)
75% of 
base risk
Base risk 75% of 
base risk 
Car user risk Base risk 
(As Table 4)
Base risk 75% of 
base risk 
75% of 
base risk 
   
Rail   
  Main rail stage 
  Access stages 
All journey stages 
12.47 
45.95 
58.42
12.47 
36.52 
48.99
12.47 
44.46 
56.92 
12.47 
35.02 
47.49 
Car:   
Single stage 135.82 135.82 101.87 101.87 
   
Change in fatalities +77.40 +86.83 +44.94 +54.38 
Ratio: car/rail 2.32 2.77 1.79 2.15 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Changes in fatalities per billion rail journeys for rail safety measure giving 10% 
reduction in passenger fatality rate for 5% increase in fares 
 Change in all fatalities per billion journeys 
Pedestrian risk Base risk 
(As Table 4)
75% of 
base risk
Base risk 75% of 
base risk
Car user risk Base risk 
(As Table 4)
Base risk 75% of 
base risk 
75% of 
base risk
  
Intended reduction on national rail -1.26 -1.26 -1.26 -1.26
Effect of fewer rail passengers -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47
Effect of fewer rail access stages -0.71 -0.58 -0.69 -0.55
Effect of replacement car journeys +2.63 +2.63 +1.97 +1.97
Total +0.19 +0.33 -0.44 -0.30
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